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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/£ pellee, 
v. 
RONNIE C. BYRD 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 950399-CA 
Priority No. 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STATE'S WAIVER ARGUMENT IMPLICATES SEPARATE 
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSES THAT COMPEL THE 
DETERMINATION THAT BYRD INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, 
AND THE PROSECUTORS QUESTIONS AT TRIAL CONCERNING THAT 
SILENCE WERE IMPROPER AND HARMFUL, 
The state contends that by introducing Byrd's post-arrest 
silence into evidence during trial, the state did not violate 
Byrd's Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-
incrimination as set forth in Dovle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 
(1976)t1 for the following reasons: "1) [Byrd] waived his right 
to remain silent; . . . and 2) any violation was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt." (Brief of Appellee ("S.B.") at 7.) 
In connection with its "waiver" argument, the state alleges 
1
 Byrd asserted in his opening brief that the state violated his 
constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment of the federal 
constitution and art. I, § 12 of the state constitution by improperly 
introducing into evidence Byrd's post-arrest silence. Byrd provided an 
analysis under the federal constitution and relied on Dovle v. Ohio, 426 
U.S. 610, 617 (1976) . Byrd noted in his opening brief that he was not 
urging a separate analysis of the issue under the Utah Constitution. 
(Brief of Appellant at 9 n.l.) 
However, since the state has argued that the prosecutor was at 
liberty to make reference to Byrd's post-arrest silence because Byrd 
"waived" the right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona 3 84 U.S. 43 6 
(1966) , Byrd asserts the Utah Constitution analysis is separate from the 
federal analysis for the "waiver" issue, as set forth herein. 
1 
that the officer's post-arrest discussions with Byrd were as 
follows: the officer advised Byrd of his rights per Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Byrd "said he understood his rights 
and wanted to talk" to the officer; the officer made an alleged 
"declaratory" statement that he had a video-tape of a drug 
transaction involving Byrd; Byrd was silent. "The next time" the 
officer initiated discussions with Byrd, Byrd allegedly confessed 
that "he just wanted to get high, and that he purchased the 
drugs." (S.B. at 7.) According to the state, Byrd waived his 
right to be silent, thereby permitting the state to introduce 
into evidence testimony concerning Byrd's silence in the face of 
the alleged "declaratory" statement.2 
Contrary to the state's recitation of the facts, the officer 
did not make a simple "declaratory" statement about the video-
taped transaction. The officer made an inquiry that demanded a 
response. He testified that when he inquired about the video-
As set forth in Byrd's opening brief, the arresting officer 
testified on direct examination that in response to inquiries concerning 
the video-taped transaction, Byrd "declined" to comment. (R. 483-85; 
529-32.) In addition, during Byrd's cross-examination, the prosecutor 
again raised the issue of Byrd's silence in the wake of the Miranda 
warnings. (R. 600-01.) The prosecutor asked Byrd the following: 
(Prosecutor) Q: Do you remember the officer testifying that when he 
gave you the Miranda warnings you said, "Yes I'll talk to you"? 
(Byrd) A: I remember him saying that. 
Q: Do you remember him giving you the Miranda warnings? 
A: I can't remember if he did or not. 
Q: So it could have been or it could not have been; that's what you 
are saying? 
A: I just know[,] I didn't talk to him. 
Q: You certainly did not say anything to him about the driver 
buying these drugs, did you? 
A: I didn't say anything about no drugs, period. 
Q: And certainly you didn't want to protect these guys, did you? 
(R. 600-01; 659-660.) 
2 
taped transaction, Byrd "declined to answer me." (R. 722.) The 
officer expected Byrd to answer, but he remained silent until a 
considerable amount of time passed and he and the officer were at 
the jail doors. Pursuant to his right to remain silent, Byrd 
exercised silence in response to officer inquiries regarding the 
video tape. 
As set forth below, since Byrd exercised his right to remain 
silent, the prosecutor's references to post-arrest silence 
violated Byrd's rights under the federal constitution and Utah's 
art. I, § § 7 and 12. 
The danger is that the jury is likely to assign much more 
weight to the defendant's previous silence than is war-
ranted. And permitting the defendant to explain the reasons 
for his silence is unlikely to overcome the strong negative 
inference that the jury is likely to draw from the fact that 
the defendant remained silent at the time of his arrest. 
U.S. v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975). 
Stated another way, emphasis on a defendant's silence in the 
wake of an arrest highlights the discrepancy between that silence 
and defendant's detailed testimony at trial, and between that 
silence and the willingness of other potential suspects to 
explain their innocence to the arresting officers (in this case, 
the potential suspects were the other occupants of the car). 
Such discrepancies instill the inference in the jury that a 
defendant has fabricated his trial testimony. Thus, use of a 
defendant's post-arrest silence after receiving Miranda warnings 
is impermissible. See Dovle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976) . 
In denying Byrd's motion for a new trial, the trial court 
did not find that Byrd "waived" his rights per Miranda as 
3 
suggested by the state. Rather, the trial court ruled that "the 
trial errors, if any, noted in defendant's motion for a new trial 
were harmless." (R. 207.) Even though the trial court did not 
base its ruling on a "waiver" analysis, the state has asked this 
Court to affirm the trial court's decision on that basis. (S.B. 
at 8 n.l.) In response thereto, Byrd urges this Court to find 
that there was no "knowing" and "voluntary" waiver. State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1273 (Utah 1993). In the alternative, 
this Court should find that under state and federal 
constitutional analyses, Byrd's silence in the wake of post-
Miranda officer inquiries constituted reinvocation of his right 
to remain silent. 
Although the state does not address the "waiver" issue under 
the state constitution, Byrd asserts that the federal and state 
constitutional analyses are separate, as set forth supra Points 
I.B. and C. If this Court fails to find that Byrd sufficiently 
reinvoked his right to remain silent under the federal analysis, 
Byrd respectfully requests that the Court reach a different 
conclusion under the state analysis. Once this Court has 
determined Byrd did not waive his constitutional right to remain 
silent, it must necessarily conclude that the prosecutor's 
references at trial to Byrd's post-arrest silence violated his 
rights under the 5th and 14th Amendments of the federal 
constitution and Utah's art. I, §§ 7 and 12. 
A. THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH WAIVER. 
Case law is clear that statements made by a defendant in 
4 
response to custodial interrogation "are not admissible as 
evidence unless the defendant is told of his Miranda rights, and 
the defendant 'knowingly and intelligently waive[s] these rights 
and agrees to answer questions. '" State v. Leyva, 906 P.2d 894, 
897 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479), cert, 
granted, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). Likewise, the defendant's 
silence is not admissible. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617. 
Courts employ every reasonable presumption against waiver. 
The state has a "heavy burden" when proving a defendant waived 
Miranda rights. See State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1108 (Utah 
App. 1990) (citing State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1211 (Utah 
1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1977)). Where a defendant 
invokes his right to silence "in any manner," that right must be 
"scrupulously honored." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. 
Although two officers were at the scene when Byrd was 
arrested, only one officer testified that Byrd "waived" his 
rights per Miranda. That testimony reflects the following: 
I advised [defendant] of his rights. I went through the four 
steps that are necessary, asked him if he would talk to me. 
He agreed, which was a waiver of his rights. And then 
proceeded to talk to the defendant. 
(R. 483, 709.) The officer's statements are uncorroborated. In 
addition, they are in direct conflict with Byrd's testimony that 
he did not waive his rights per Miranda. (R. 600, 762.) 
The state failed to establish a clear and knowing waiver. 
The requirement that a defendant be advised of Miranda rights and 
knowingly and voluntarily waive such rights in order to admit a 
statement made during custodial interrogation remains intact. 
5 
[T]he primary protection afforded suspects subject to 
custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves. 
n[F]ull comprehension of the rights to remain silent and 
request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever 
coercion is inherent in the interrogation process." A 
suspect who knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to 
counsel after having that right explained to him has 
indicated his willingness to deal with police unassisted. 
Davis v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2356 (1994) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). The state's "waiver" evidence does not 
establish a knowing and voluntary waiver. Thus the state should 
have been precluded at trial from referring to Byrd's silence in 
the wake of Miranda warnings. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617. 
In the event this Court disagrees and determines the state 
has established an initial "waiver," Byrd's subsequent expression 
compels the determination that he reinvoked his right to remain 
silent, as set forth below. 
B. UNDER A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, "REINVOCATION" 
OF THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT REQUIRES OFFICERS TO 
DISCONTINUE QUESTIONING, AND LOGICALLY PRECLUDES THE 
PROSECUTOR FROM REFERRING TO SUCH QUESTIONING DURING TRIAL. 
In support of the "waiver" argument, the state relies only 
on a federal constitutional analysis as set forth in Davis v. 
U.S., 114 S.Ct. 2350 (1994). The state asserts Byrd did not 
"[re]invoke the right 'sufficiently clearly that a reasonable 
police officer in the circumstances would understand the 
statement to be a request for an attorney.'" (S.B. at 13 
(quoting Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2355).) 
In Davis, prior to police interrogation the defendant waived 
his right to counsel both orally and in writing. Id. at 2353. 
When he later expressed an equivocal intent to reinvoke his right 
6 
to an attorney, the officer reminded the defendant of his rights 
per Miranda and clarified whether defendant was requesting 
counsel. Id. The defendant responded that he was not. Thus, 
the officer continued the interview. When the defendant again 
equivocally invoked his right to counsel, the questioning ceased. 
Id. The Davis Court ruled that after a defendant has made a 
knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, law 
enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless 
the defendant clearly reinvokes that right. The Court elaborated: 
"Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel 'requires, at a 
minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an 
expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.'" 
Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2355 (cites omitted). 
At least one court has held that Davis is not applicable 
where the defendant invokes his right to silence rather than 
counsel. See State v. Strayhand, 911 P.2d 577, 592-93 (Ariz. 
App. Div. 1 1995). The rationale for the Strayhand holding was 
that Davis did not expressly discuss an equivocal assertion of 
the right to silence, and existing state case law requiring 
clarification of an equivocal assertion of the right to silence 
remains in effect until the United States Supreme Court rules 
otherwise. As further set forth infra. Point I.C., Utah appellate 
decisions, which have directly addressed the issue of whether 
officers can proceed with questioning when defendant equivocally 
invokes Miranda rights, have consistently held that officers are 
limited to asking clarifying questions. See State v. Griffin, 754 
7 
P.2d 965, 969 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 
1109 (Utah App. 1990); and State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 902 
(Utah App. 1993). Gutierrez involved the equivocal invocation of 
the right to silence and was not overruled by Davis. 
In the event this Court nevertheless determines Davis 
governs this case and requires a clear reinvocation of the right 
to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment, Byrd's expression 
could not have been clearer: silence in the face of officer 
interrogation. It was a reinvocation of the right to remain 
silent. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 610. Consider what happened next in 
Byrd's case: after Byrd "declined to answer" the officer's 
inquiries, the officer discontinued discussions for approximately 
2 0 minutes until he was pulling into the jail with Byrd, at which 
time the officer began interrogations again and Byrd allegedly 
confessed to buying the drugs.3 The officer must have recognized 
Byrd's earlier silence in the face of interrogation to be an 
invocation of the right to remain silent. 
In further support of the "waiver" argument under Davis, the 
state relied on this Court's ruling in Leyva, 906 P.2d at 896. 
There, officers pulled defendant over after a high-speed chase, 
removed defendant from the car, and immediately handcuffed him. 
Thirty minutes after the arrest, the officer read defendant his 
3
 Because of the passage of approximately 20 minutes (R. 443, 510, 
515, 571, 572-73), during which time Byrd remained silent, and Byrd's 
reinvocation of the right to remain silent, the arresting officer at 
least should have provided Byrd with fresh Miranda warnings before asking 
him, "What's up, what's going on?" when he was pulling into the jail with 
Byrd. (R. 489-90); Michigan v. Moselv, 423 U.S. 96, 104-06 (1975). 
8 
rights per Miranda, and asked defendant if he understood them. 
Leyva, 906 P.2d at 896. When the defendant responded "yes," the 
officer asked defendant if he wished to talk. Defendant first 
answered "I don't know," prompting the officer to inform him that 
he did not have to answer questions and that it was up to 
defendant. Defendant nodded his head. The officer then asked 
questions, which defendant answered. Id. 
The state in Lewa asserted an "'unhesitating and 
incriminating' response demonstrate[d] a valid waiver." Id. at 
899. Here, the state should recognize that unmistakable silence 
and a refusal to respond in the face of interrogation is an invo-
cation of the right to remain silent. This is a logical way to 
exercise the right to remain silent. Once a defendant indicates 
in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, 
that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must 
cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to 
exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken 
after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than 
the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. 
Leyva, 906 P.2d at 897 (quoting, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74). 
The state also relies on State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). That case is 
distinguishable where the state argued "there [was] no sign that 
Harrison ever invoked his right to silence" and Harrison did not 
assert on appeal that he ever invoked such a right. 805 P.2d at 
787-88. The Harrison case brings us back to the prosecutor's 
misconduct in eliciting testimony concerning a defendant's 
silence. The prosecutor in Harrison did not reference post-
Miranda statements or silence, but placed Harrison's trial 
9 
testimony into question by suggesting during closing argument 
that Harrison fabricated his story. In that context, "the 
statement did not 'naturally and necessarily' invite the jury to 
consider anything Harrison may or may not have said" immediately 
following his arrest. Id. at 788. 
However, in this case, there could be no mistake that the 
prosecutor was eliciting testimony concerning post-arrest 
silence. He elicited testimony that Byrd said "nothing" in the 
face of officer interrogations immediately following arrest. 
Since Byrd's silence reflected an unequivocal reinvocation of his 
rights per Miranda, the prosecutor was prohibited from referring 
to Byrd's post-arrest silence. The prosecutor should have been 
precluded during trial from referencing Byrd's post-arrest and 
post-Miranda silence. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976) . 
C. SINCE ARTICLE I, S 12 REQUIRES AN OFFICER TO LIMIT DIS-
CUSSIONS TO CLARIFYING QUESTIONS WHEN AN IN-CUSTODY SUSPECT 
EQUIVOCALLY INVOKES HIS RIGHT TO SILENCE, IT WAS IMPROPER 
FOR THE PROSECUTOR TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF BYRD'S SILENCE. 
In the event this Court determines Byrd's silence does not 
constitute a reinvocation of his rights per Miranda under Davis, 
supra Point I.B., the Utah Constitution compels a different 
result. Byrd's right to be free from compulsory self-
incrimination under the Utah Constitution requires an officer to 
clarify an equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent; 
failure to clarify requires that any statements made during 
continued interrogation be suppressed. Article I, § 12 of the 
Utah Constitution requires (1) that officers give Miranda-like 
warnings to in-custody suspects, and (2) that where a suspect 
10 
makes an ambiguous reference to his right to silence, an officer 
who is not reasonably certain whether the suspect is invoking 
that right is limited to asking clarifying questions. 
In this matter, Byrd exercised his right to remain silent by 
remaining silent in the face of police inquiries. Under the Utah 
Constitution, to the extent Byrd's conduct was ambiguous, the 
officer was required to limit additional discussions to 
clarifying questions. Since the officer failed to do so, the 
prosecutor was prohibited from making reference to Byrd's silence 
during trial. 
1. ARTICLE I, § 12 REQUIRES OFFICERS TO GIVE MIRANDA-LIKE 
WARNINGS TO AN IN-CUSTODY SUSPECT. 
The analysis under art. I, § 12 begins with determining 
whether the officer is required under the Utah Constitution to 
give Miranda-like warnings. Art. I, § 12 provides in part that 
11
 [t]he accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself." Although the Utah Supreme Court indicated in State v. 
Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 n.2 (Utah 1996), that it has never 
held that "Miranda-type warnings are required under the Utah 
constitution" (see also Sandy City v. Larson, 733 P.2d 137, 141 
(Utah 1987) (Durham, J., concurring and dissenting)), Byrd 
asserts Utah's art. I, § 12 requires such warnings. 
The Miranda decision and the analysis and rationale employed 
by the United States Supreme Court in reaching its decision in 
that case provide guidance to this Court in determining whether 
Miranda-like warnings are required for custodial interrogations 
pursuant to art. I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution. The Miranda 
11 
court focused on the "historical development of the privilege" 
against self-incrimination, "the sound policies which have 
nurtured its evolution," and judicial precedent in determining 
that procedural safeguards are necessary in order to effectuate 
the privilege. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459, 462-63. 
a. The historical development. 
The federal rights embodied in the Fifth Amendment are 
"precious rights [which] were fixed in our [federal] Constitution 
only after centuries of persecution and struggle." Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 442. The Miranda warnings were fashioned to preserve 
such rights which could be "put in jeopardy [] through official 
overbearing." Id. The warnings ensure that the protection 
against self-incrimination as envisioned by our country's foun-
ders remains viable and does not become a "form of words." Id. 
In implementing the warnings, the United States Supreme 
Court considered Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896), a 
decision issued in 1896, the year Utah's constitution was 
adopted. Miranda, 3 84 U.S. at 443. The Brown Court recognized 
that the privilege against self-incrimination "'had its origin in 
a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods 
of interrogating accused persons.'" Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442 
(quoting Brown, 161 U.S. at 596-97). 
Article I, § 12 has similar origins. In American Fork City 
v. Cosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985), this Court traced the 
history of the Utah constitutional protection and determined that 
at the time the Utah provision was adopted, the "prevailing view" 
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was that differences in wording between the Utah provision and 
the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination were 
not significant. Id. at 1072. This Court considered the Utah 
Constitutional Convention Proceedings and concluded: 
Thus, if any intent can be derived from the proceedings of 
Utah's Constitutional Convention, it is that the framers 
intended the privilege to have the same scope that it had 
under similar constitutional provisions, which was the scope 
it had at common law. 
• * * 
It is widely acknowledged that the common law privilege 
against self-incrimination was aimed directly at the 
inquisitorial system of the English ecclesiastical courts, 
traces of which began to creep into the civil law system at 
an early date. 
Id. at 1073 (cites omitted); see also Larson, 733 P.2d at 138. 
Utah's unique history at the time the state constitution was 
adopted also supports the giving of Miranda-like warnings. The 
inquisitorial procedure condemned in Coscrrove and Miranda was 
used or feared during the federal raids against polygamist 
families during the time period immediately preceding statehood. 
Families were jailed if they refused to "cooperate" with federal 
marshals. Bradley, Hide and Seek: Children on the Underground, 
51 Utah Hist. Q. 133, 142 (1983); ex parte Harris, 5 P. 129 (Utah 
1884). The drafters of the state constitution were no doubt 
sensitive to the importance of this protection. 
Utah law reflects that Utah's constitutional provision 
shares a history with the Fifth Amendment. Cosgrove, 701 P.2d at 
1073; Larson, 733 P.2d at 138. The discussion in Miranda of the 
historical development of the Fifth Amendment provision, which 
supports implementation of the warnings, is applicable to the 
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art. I, § 12 provision. 
b. Sound policies which have nurtured its evolution. 
The sound policies which have nurtured the evolution of the 
right against self-incrimination also supported the 
implementation of warnings in Miranda. The requirement that 
officers give "Miranda warnings" was imposed as a procedural 
safeguard aimed at "secur[ing] the privilege against self-
incrimination." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The warnings were 
structured as a means "to inform accused persons of their right 
to silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise 
it." Id. The court recognized the inherently compulsive 
atmosphere of custodial interrogation and that the "practice of 
incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation's 
most cherished principles--that the individual not be compelled 
to incriminate himself." Id. at 457-58. The Miranda warnings 
were formulated "to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial 
surroundings." Id. The privilege itself as well as the Miranda 
requirement are based in part on "the respect a government--state 
or federal--must accord to the dignity and integrity of its 
citizens." Id. at 460. The same policies have nurtured art. I, 
§ 12, see Coscrrove, 701 P. 2d at 1073, supporting implementation 
of Miranda-like warnings to preserve art. I, § 12 protections. 
c. Judicial precedent. 
In fashioning the Miranda warnings, the United States 
Supreme Court considered judicial precedent which "clearly 
establishe[d]" the "application of the privilege to incommunicado 
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interrogation." Id. at 457-58. It determined that precedent, 
including, inter alia, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), 
supported and required the imposition of procedural safeguards. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470. 
Utah precedent supports a requirement that Miranda-type 
warnings be given in order to preserve the Utah constitutional 
protection. In In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 650 
(Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court held that procedural 
protections patterned after the Miranda warnings are required in 
interrogations made pursuant to the Subpoena Powers Act ("the 
Act") if the art. I, § 12 privilege against giving compelled 
evidence "is to be meaningfully available." Id. at 648. 
The court reasoned that in interrogations under the Act, 
"the psychological compulsion may be more analogous to that 
present in a police custodial inquiry, rather than one before the 
grand jury." Id. "Because the privilege is intended to protect 
against confessions secured by the sheer force of psychological 
intimidation," the court concluded that the Fifth Amendment and 
art. I, § 12 mandate procedural protections along the lines of 
those required by Miranda. Id. The court used the Miranda 
warnings as a "general guide," id., in outlining the following 
warnings to be given in this context. First, the witness must be 
informed "of the general subject matter of the investigation." 
Id. at 649. Second, the witness must be informed that s/he "may 
refuse to answer any question or produce any evidence of a 
communicative nature that may result in self-incrimination." Id. 
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Third, the witness must be informed "that any information 
provided may be used against the individual in court." Id. 
Fourth, the witness must be informed that s/he "may have counsel 
present." Id. Finally, the witness must be informed that s/he 
is a "target" of the investigation and, if that is the case, "the 
nature of the charges under consideration against them." Id. 
The first warning is not required under Miranda because an 
individual in a police custody setting "almost certainly will 
know the nature of the crime being investigated," whereas an 
individual subpoenaed under the Subpoena Powers Act will have no 
such knowledge. Id. The fifth requirement is based only on the 
Utah Constitution. Id. at 650. The Utah Supreme Court 
recognized that in an earlier decision, the United States Supreme 
Court refused to adopt a warning under the Fifth Amendment 
applicable to "target" witnesses. Id. at 649-50 (considering 
U.S. v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977)). "[T] he entire tone of 
Washington constrains us from finding that the federal 
constitution requires routine target warnings in the context of 
all Subpoena Powers Act interrogations." Id. at 650. 
Although the state and federal rights against self-
incrimination share common law roots, they are subject to 
differing interpretations under certain circumstances. In that 
regard, the Utah court considered "whether, as a matter of state 
law, we will require target warnings" under art. I, § 12 of the 
Utah Constitution. Id. at 650. 
Fully ten years before Washington, this Court ruled in State 
v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 225, 429 P.2d 969, 975 (1967), 
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that article I, section 12 requires that state grand jury 
witnesses be notified of their target status and of the 
charges being considered against them. At this time, we see 
no reason to reexamine our holding in Rugaeri, and we think 
that Subpoena Powers Act targets are similarly situated with 
respect to their privilege against self-incrimination as are 
state grand jury targets. Therefore, we hold that the 
target warnings required by Ruggeri must be given to 
Subpoena Powers Act targets, and we read such a requirement 
into the Act. Utah Const, art. I, § 12. 
Id. Although the Ruggeri court only nominally mentioned art. I, 
§ 12, its reference was sufficient to reaffirm the Ruggeri 
holding under the Utah Constitution. Id. at 650. 
In re Investigation supports that the Utah Constitution re-
quires certain Miranda-based warnings to preserve constitutional 
rights where an individual is subpoenaed under the Act. The same 
rationale that applies for requiring warnings in that context 
applies when an individual is subjected to custodial questioning 
by the police. In fact, given the coercive nature of such 
interrogations, warnings are more necessary in the custodial 
interrogation context than they are for a witness subpoenaed 
under the Act. 
Additionally, it was apparently the pre-Miranda practice in 
Utah to inform defendants subjected to custodial interrogation of 
their rights. See State v. Belgard, 479 P.2d 344, 344 (Utah 1971) 
(prior to Miranda decision, defendant "was warned of his rights, 
except that he was entitled to appointed counsel without 
charge"); State v. Gardner, 230 P.2d 559 (Utah 1951) (no evidence 
that confession was made as the result of "coercion, pressure or 
mistreatment" where statement was made "after repeated 
consultation with his lawyers and after he had twice been fully 
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informed of his rights on previous occasions"). 
Various courts from other states have required Miranda-like 
warnings under their state constitutions. See, e.g., Traylor v. 
State, 596 So.2d 957, 961 n.2 (Fla. 1992) (listing state courts 
which have "construed the self-incrimination provisions of their 
state constitutions independently of the federal court's Fifth 
Amendment holding"); State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 664 (Ha. 
1971); State v. Johnson, 669 A.2d 222 (N.H. 1995); State v. 
Jones, 534 A.2d 1199, 1202 n.3 (Conn. 1987); Comm. v. Smith, 593 
N.E.2d 1288 (Mass. 1992); State v. Evans, 523 A.2d 1306, 1310 n.6 
(Conn. 1987) (recognizing Miranda warnings have "independent 
significance" under state constitution). The rationale in these 
cases is equally applicable to the Utah provision. See, e.g. , 
Santiago, 492 P.2d at 664-65 (employing rationale for Miranda 
decision; rule preserves integrity of the judicial process). 
The historical development of the art. I, § 12 privilege 
including the history it shares with the Fifth Amendment 
provision as well as Utah's unique history, "the sound policies 
which have nurtured its evolution," and judicial precedent all 
demonstrate that procedural safeguards are necessary to preserve 
the art. I, § 12 privilege. Accordingly, the state 
constitutional privilege requires officers to provide Miranda-
like warnings to suspects who are subjected to custodial 
interrogation in order to preserve the privilege and ensure that 
it does not become a mere "form of words." 
2. ARTICLE I, § 12 REQUIRES THAT WHERE AN IN-CUSTODY SUS-
PECT MAKES AN EQUIVOCAL ASSERTION OF HIS RIGHT TO SILENCE, 
FURTHER QUESTIONING IS LIMITED TO CLARIFYING THE ASSERTION. 
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Regardless of whether the Utah Constitution requires that a 
suspect be given Miranda-like warnings, the Utah Constitution 
nevertheless requires that officers be limited to asking clarify-
ing questions where a suspect equivocally invokes his right to 
silence. Although the art. I, § 12 right against self-incrimina-
tion evolved from the same common law roots as the 5th Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination, the scope of the state 
constitutional privilege may be broader in certain circumstances 
than its federal counterpart. See In re Investigation, 754 P.2d 
at 646-47; Ruggeri, 429 P.2d at 973; Cosgrove, 701 P.2d at 1073 
("the scope of the constitutional guarantees is not limited by 
their historical roots"). As discussed supra Point I.C.I., the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that the Utah privilege is broader 
than the Fifth Amendment privilege in that it requires officials 
to inform an individual that he is a "target" of a grand jury 
investigation as well as the nature of the charges for which he 
is under investigation. In re Investigations, 754 P.2d at 649-50. 
Perhaps the most compelling indication that the Utah 
protection is stronger than the federal is the analysis employed 
in the equivocal-invocation context by the court in State v. 
Wood, 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993) (disavowed on other grounds, 
Mirguet, 914 P.2d at 1147 n.2), and by this Court in Griffin, 754 
P.2d at 969, Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1109, and Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 
at 902. When analyzing equivocal invocations of Miranda rights, 
Utah courts consistently have held that officers are limited to 
asking clarifying questions. 
The rationale for employing this middle ground test is that 
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it provides "a practical and sensible solution." The 
clarification approach allows a suspect to answer further 
questions if s/he is so inclined while also protecting the 
suspect's right to counsel and silence. Wood, 868 P.2d at 84. 
It provides a clear, bright line rule for officers: When they 
are not reasonably certain whether a suspect is invoking his 
rights, they must focus on clarifying that issue. This approach 
ensures that the concerns about compelled testimony discussed in 
Miranda and its progeny are met. See Id. 
Just as the Utah Supreme Court found no reason to overrule 
its decision in Ruggeri after the United States Supreme Court 
departed from that view, there is no reason to depart from Wood 
and this Court's decisions in Griffin, Sampson, and Gutierrez. 
When analyzing equivocal invocations of Miranda rights, the 
officer must be limited in his inquiries to clarifying the 
invocation of the right to remain silent. Wood and the decisions 
of this Court are well-reasoned and offer the most sensible 
approach for officers who are faced with that circumstance. 
Indeed, the clarification approach was embraced by the majority 
of courts confronted with the issue prior to Davis. See Wood, 
868 P.2d at 84; Lewa, 906 P.2d at 897-98; Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 
2359-60 (Souter, J., concurring).4 
4
 Although a majority of the United States Supreme Court rejected 
the clarification approach in the post-waiver context, four of the 
justices agree with the majority of other courts which have considered 
the issue that clarification is required to preserve the privilege. See 
Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring in result, joined by 
Blackmun, Stevens and Ginsburg, J.J.). 
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As this Court, Justice Souter (note 4, supra) and various 
other courts recognized, criminal defendants often lack 
linguistic and educational skills and are intimidated by the 
coercive nature of custodial interrogations. See note 4, supra; 
Lewa, 906 P. 2d at 897. Under such circumstances, attempts by 
individuals to assert or reassert their rights are often muddled 
or ambiguous. Thus clarifying such ambiguities provides officers 
with a bright line approach. Any other result would allow the 
state to structure an argument that defendant's assertion was 
equivocal, leaving officers free to trample over precious rights. 
The only fair, reasonable approach is to require officers to 
clarify an ambiguous reference to Miranda or art. I, § 12 rights. 
Id. If the art. I, § 12 protection is to remain available in a 
meaningful way, this Court should reaffirm Wood, Gutierrez, 
Sampson, and Griffin as being required by the Utah Constitution. 
Other courts have rejected the holding in Davis under their 
state constitutions. See State v. Hoev. 881 P.2d 504, 524 (Ha. 
1994) (state failed to establish defendant waived right to 
counsel under state constitution where officers did not clarify 
equivocal request); Deck v. State, 653 So.2d 434, 437 (Fla. App. 
5 Dist. 1995) (Florida constitution requires clarification of 
equivocal assertion of right to silence); see also Strayhand, 911 
P.2d at 592-93, reaffirming State v. Finehout, 665 P.2d 570, 573 
(Ariz. 1983), which requires clarification of equivocal 
references to right to silence despite Davis decision. 
Additionally, the majority of pre-Davis decisions require 
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clarification of equivocal references to the right to counsel or 
silence. See, e.g., Holland v. State, 587 So.2d 848, 856 (Miss. 
1991) ("This Court has joined the trend by permitting an 
interrogator to clarify ambiguous utterances"); State v. 
Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 223 (Minn. 1988); State v. Moulds, 673 
P.2d 1074, 1082 (Idaho App. 1983). 
In this matter, Byrd's silence was an unequivocal reinvoca-
tion of the right to remain silent. Under the Utah Constitution, 
to the extent the exercise of Byrd's silence was ambiguous, the 
officer was limited to asking clarifying questions. Because the 
officer failed in that task, (R. 722-23), the officer was 
prohibited from having further discussions with Byrd. Further, 
it was improper for the prosecutor to present evidence of Byrd's 
silence in the wake of post-Miranda police inquiries. Byrd's 
convictions should be reversed. 
D. THE VIOLATION OF BYRD'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT RESULTED IN 
PREJUDICIAL HARM. 
The state asserts, in any event, that any error in 
permitting the prosecutor to elicit testimony concerning Byrd's 
silence in the wake of the Miranda warnings was "harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt." (S.B. at 15.) In support of that assertion, 
the state focuses on evidence supporting Byrd's guilt, "[m]ost 
significantly, defendant['s] admi[ssion] to Detective Thurgood 
that he purchased the drugs because he wanted to get high. (R. 
490.)" (S.B. at 16.) Yet if the trial court had ruled, as it 
should have, that Byrd's post-Miranda silence constituted an 
invocation of his right to remain silent precluding reference to 
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the silence, by nature of that ruling, the later "confession" 
evidence necessarily would have been inadmissible for want of 
valid Miranda warnings. In that instance, because Byrd exercised 
his right to remain silent, the officer's failure to at least 
reMirandize Byrd before asking "what's up?" invalidated the 
alleged confession. See note 3, supra. 
The reference to Byrd's silence and the alleged confession 
are directly linked. Once Byrd expressed his desire to remain 
silent, the officer's subsequent discussions with Byrd without 
giving him fresh Miranda warnings violated the state and federal 
constitutions. The trial court's error in failing to grant a new 
trial as a result of the improper testimony, and/or in failing to 
admonish the jury to disregard such evidence had a direct and 
prejudicial impact on the confession evidence.5 The additional 
"circumstantial evidence of [Byrd's] guilt" as identified by the 
state (S.B. at 16-18) is slight. Thus, the error was prejudicial 
as set forth herein and as further set forth in Byrd's opening 
brief (Brief of Appellant, dated September 6, 1996). 
5
 The state suggests Byrd should have requested that the trial court 
specifically admonish the jury to disregard the testimony concerning 
Byrd's silence or request a curative instruction (S.B. at 19), and that 
his failure to do so has precluded him from raising the issue on appeal. 
The state seeks to elevate "preservation" requirements beyond what is 
necessary. Byrd did all that was required of him by timely objecting to 
the testimony and stating the basis for the objection. Once Byrd made 
his objections, the trial court was required to render a ruling, and in 
this case, take appropriate, curative measures. 
This matter was in an unusual posture where the trial court refused 
to rule on the timely trial objection until months after the trial. The 
jury had long since been dismissed. If the trial court had been more 
timely in its ruling, a curative instruction would have been appropriate. 
If the trial court had timely admonished the jury, the parties would have 
been on notice that the confession evidence was poisoned where the 
officer failed to reMirandize Byrd. 
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POINT II. BYRD'S COMPLAINT WITH REGARD TO THE STATE#S 
FAILURE TO SUPPLEMENT DISCOVERY FOCUSES ON HIS CREDIBILITY 
TO THE JURY, NOT THE VALIDITY OF HIS DEFENSE. 
In response to Byrd's complaint that the state admittedly 
failed to supplement its discovery with facts bearing directly on 
the officers' search of the car, the state asserts that if 
counsel for Byrd had known about the changed testimony, "counsel 
could have developed a theory[/theme] consistent with the 
evidence." (S.B. 20 and 22.) Byrd does not contend he was unable 
to "develop" a defense "theme" or "theory consistent with the 
evidence." Byrd's contention is that the state's failure to dis-
close the critical information created an impression in the minds 
of the jurors that Byrd's defense was fabricated; and that the 
new testimony unraveled the "fabric" leaving Byrd to pick up the 
threads and put it back together. In that sense, Byrd's 
credibility with the jury was irreparably compromised. 
If Byrd's counsel had been apprised of the change in 
testimony, even just prior to opening arguments, counsel could 
have proceeded with Byrd's case, still consistent with the 
evidence, but lacking the critical appearance of "salvaging" the 
case. Surely such an appearance left the jury wondering. 
Contrary to the state's assertions, Byrd's counsel was not 
able to turn the situation around. In opening arguments, counsel 
relied on the officer's previous version of the facts, and direc-
ted the jury to pay special and close attention to those facts as 
they came into evidence. However, because the testimony changed, 
the facts did not come into evidence as promised. Thus the jury's 
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attention was focused on the absolute conflict between the facts 
and the representations made by counsel in opening argument. 
The state admits it failed to supplement discovery. It 
claims, however, that Byrd was not prejudiced by the state's ad-
mitted failure. Contrary to that assertion, the prejudice caused 
by the surprise testimony was sufficient to require reversal. 
In addition, under the cumulative error doctrine, see State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993), reversal is appropriate 
if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines confi-
dence that a fair trial was had. Under that doctrine, reversal 
here is appropriate and necessary. As set forth above, the 
testimony referencing Byrd's silence violated his right against 
self incrimination, caused the jury to focus on the fact that he 
did not explain his innocence when he was arrested, and related 
to later testimony concerning an alleged confession. Compound 
that with out-dated discovery that compromised the credibility of 
Byrd's case in the eyes of the jury. Absent these errors, the 
state's evidence was not particularly strong. 
CONCLUSION 
There is a reasonable probability that on retrial, the jury 
will render a verdict more favorable to Byrd. State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992). Byrd's convictions for two counts 
of unlawful possession of a controlled substance should be 
vacated and remanded for a new trial. 
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